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In their commentary on our earlier review (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), Segal 
and Shaw minimize the problems faced by the cogni. ~, e approach to the study 
o f  depression. Their repeated references to cognitive processes that are la- 
tent and therefore not reported by subjects represent a substantial retreat 
f rom empiricism. In general, the notion o f  schema or schematic processing 
remains problematic. Published research does not support the existence o f  
an identifiable cognitive vulnerability to depression. Other conceptual 
methodological and empirical difficulties are noted. We argue that the cen- 
tral defect in current cognitive approaches to depression is their inattention 
to the difficulties faced by depressed persons in their everyday environments, 
how they cope, and with what consequences. 
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Segal and Shaw present a discussion intended to serve two purposes: first, 
to clarify the misconceptions they feel were present in our earlier review of 
cognitive approaches to the study of depression (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983), and 
second, to offer an updated perspective on the issues discussed in that arti- 
cle. In this paper we will address these two aspects of  Segal and Shaw's arti- 
cle, and in addition, we will take this opportunity to present briefly our own 
updated view of  the role of cognition in depression. 
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Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109. 
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In our original paper, we acknowledged that it was the outstanding 
achievement of the cognitive perspective that such a large literature was 
available for critical scrutiny. Overall, however, we found that the empirical 
support for the most distinctive claims of the two major cognitive models 
was less consistent than had generally been assumed. Furthermore, we found 
that key concepts were not well specified, thinly veiled tautologies were ram- 
pant, and weak correlational methodologies were being accepted as the basis 
for strong causal inferences. Our concluding assessment was not just that 
the cognitive models were being embarrassed by the accumulating data, but 
that beyond this, there was cause for pessimism, in that any data that could 
conceivably be generated by the methods currently in use were limited in what 
they could offer for the models' refinement. 
Some of the issues were raised in that article can be more easily resolv- 
ed than can others. We remain conceived that how depressed people think 
will prove important in any comprehensive model of this disorder. We are 
also convinced, however, that current cognitive models face some formidable 
conceptual, methodological, and empirical difficulties, and that the field 
would benefit from the generation of rival hypotheses and alternative 
methodologies. A viable model of the role of cognition in depression will 
likely look quite different than what is currently available, and radically dif- 
ferent methodologies are needed if the claims of such a model are to be em- 
pirically grounded. 
Segal and Shaw indicate that they accept some of our earlier conclu- 
sions regarding conceptual and methodological problems of the cognitive 
perspective, although unfortunately they do not elaborate on which conclu- 
sions there is agreement or on what the implications of these conclusions 
are for the claims of the cognitive perspective. Beyond that, Segal and Shaw 
suggest that we have obliquely portrayed some pivotal issues in the study 
of the role of cognition in depression, and that this presentation diminishes 
the validity of our conclusions. We are confident that a rereading of our 
original review will answer many of their concerns. Other of their points in- 
volve major revisions of the original claims of the cognitive perspective. Not 
all of these revisions are acknowledged as such, however, and we believe that 
some of their suggestions direct researchers down already well-trodden paths 
and cul-de-sacs that are not likely to yield any surprising discoveries. 
Our general sense is that Segal and Shaw have minimized the problems 
faced by the cognitive perspective and have overestimated the potential of 
some solutions that are currently being attempted. Furthermore, the results 
of many of the new studies that they cite in their update of empirical research 
only strengthen our original conclusions. In addition to replying to their ar- 
ticle, therefore, we will delineate further the challenges that we feel face both 
current cognitive models of depression and whatever alternatives may suc- 
ceed them. 
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P O T A T O E S  OR SPUDS? 
Segal and Shaw wish to prevent difficulties that they perceive as limited 
to the learned helplessness model from reflecting badly upon Beck's model, 
and they caution that they "regard it as premature to view these two models 
as identical." However, the only situation in which they are able to contrast 
the two models involves expectancy changes following laboratory failure ex- 
periences. This is an unfortunate choice of experimental paradigms. As we 
noted in our original review, interest in such studies waned with an accumula- 
tion of null findings and the recognition that even positive findings would 
be ambiguous in their interpretation. Furthermore, Abramson, Seligman, 
and Teasdale (1978) themselves dismissed the relevance of such studies to 
their reformulation: "In the absence of knowledge about individual attribu- 
tions, the reformulated model cannot make clearcut predictions about ex- 
pectancy changes and helplessness" (p. 63). 
Ultimately, existing cognitive models of depression may be refined in 
a way that allows the execution of decisive empirical tests and the emergence 
of a single dominant paradigm. However, we believe that the current stalemate 
is indicative of some basic conceptual problems: Cognitive concepts are so 
slippery and indeterminate that clashes between a given model and data are 
likely to be unsatisfactory in their outcome. 
Key concepts in the study of cognition in depression are probably best 
seen as loosely metaphorical in nature. Cognitive researchers have rarely been 
able to go beyond simple demonstrations that depressed persons say negative 
and pessimistic things about themeselves and their situations. They have yet 
to begin to establish the basis for their strong claims about how these self- 
reports came about. As we noted in our earlier review, current methodologies 
do not allow unambiguous demonstrations that depressed persons are any 
more distorted in their thinking than nondepressed persons. Such demonstra- 
tions may not even be attainable. The penchant for elaborate models of in- 
formation processing is therefore not matched by the existence of 
methodologies that allow much discrimination among rival descriptions of 
these processes. Segal and Shaw exemplify a long-standing gap between 
method and inference in their uncritical acceptance of what appears to be 
a convention measure of attitudes, the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; 
Weissman & Beck, 1978), as evidence of the "operation of hyperactive 
schemata." Furthermore, the increasing reference to latent and deep processes 
by Segal and Shaw and others (Beck, 1984; Riskind & Rholes, 1984) is reduc- 
ing the possible points of contact between cognitive formulations and em- 
pirical data. As Silverman, Silverman, and Eardley (1984b) state, for cognitive 
theorists to fall back to a position that in depression-prone people dysfunc- 
tional attitudes are not conscious but latent (i.e., they are there but not detec- 
table) seems "an undignified retreat." 
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PROBLEMS WITH SCHEMA-BASED E X P L A N A T I O N S  
OF DEPRESSION 
Segal and Shaw seem particularly concerned that the difficulties of the 
learned helplessness model will damage the credibility of Beck's schema-based 
model of depressive thinking, but they fail to come to terms with the pitfalls 
of explanations based on this concept. The concept of schema is typically 
used in discussions of depression in a way that is quite different from its 
original usage in experimental cognitive psychology, and it now provides a 
mere label rather than much explanatory power. One might recall Moliere's 
doctoral candidate explaining that the "cause and reason" that opium puts 
people to sleep is that it possesses a dormitive principle. 
Depressogenic schemata are taken as an explanation of why depressed 
persons persist in self-defeating and painful attitudes in the face of osten- 
sibly contradictory experiences. Yet, empirically at least, the evidence that 
is offered for the operation of schema is generally limited to the very negative 
verbalizations that the concept explains: Depressed persons make negative 
verbalizations because of the operation of hyperactive negative schemata, 
and we know this because they make negative verbalizations. 
Furthermore, Shaw (1979) himself has cogently noted, commitment to 
schema as an explanation makes it difficult to accommodate the observa- 
tion that humans (including depressed persons) can readily make changes 
in their thought processes as a result of their experience (see Beck, 1967, for 
early findings concerning depressed persons' response to success experiences). 
Finally, to argue, as cognitive theorists do, that perception is schematic-  
i.e., that involves an application of stable, organized representation of past 
experiences in order to structure new ones- int roduces  a host of new pro- 
blems. For one, it begs the question of  what guides the activation and mat- 
ching of schemata to stimuli. If one attempts to treat schematic explanations 
as more than loose metaphors, one quickly becomes lost in logical difficulties, 
including an infinite regress (Heil, 1983). 
We noted in our original article that, from an empirical perspective, 
if one fails to find expected differences between depressed and nondepress- 
ed persons in reactions to a stimulus, it is embarrassing to Beck's model. 
Yet if one obtains hypothesized results, one is still left far from having strong 
support for the operation of the specific processes posited by the model. Segai 
and Shaw convey little sense of how one should proceed in order to obtain 
evidence that these processes, rather than some alternative, are responsible 
for the differences that are observed. Such difficulties are a matter of fuzzy 
thinking, not the lack of empirical data, and they are not going to be readily 
resolved. 
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CAUSALITY 
Segal and Shaw state that we were correct in pointing out that the 
etiological stance in "earlier formulations" of the cognitive theory was one 
of "cognitive primacy." They go on to state that we did not concede in our 
review that "Beck's model has evolved in its acknowledgment of the com- 
plexity of causal factors in depression." In support of this evolution, Segal 
and Shaw cite a number of papers, all of  which were published after our 
review had gone to press. It thus appears that we took a reasonable stance 
in working with the then current versions of the cognitive models. 
It may now be appropriate to bow to the accumulation of empirical 
findings and acknowledge that the evidence that cognitions are causal in 
depression is weak. However, in the interest of good scholarship, one should 
also admit that such claims of causality have been frequently made in the 
past and continue to be made, and t ha t -de sp i t e  assertions by Segal and 
S h a w - t h e  "search for a fundamental causal priority of cognition over af- 
fect" is not merely the invention of critics of the models. Numerous examples 
of  causal statements could be cited. For instance, authors who have worked 
closely with both Beck and Shaw have written: "The theory makes a clear 
causal relationship between cognition and behavioral, affective, and 
physiological disturbances. The theory goes beyond descriptive detailing of 
the experience of  depression and asserts that cognitions cause and maintain 
the depressive syndrome" (Rush & Giles, 1982, p. 151). Furthermore, Beck 
himself has very recently stated that "the cognitive theory of  depression pro- 
poses that depression is primarily a result of the tendency to view the self, 
the future, and the world in an unrealistically negative manner" (Sacco & 
Beck, 1985, p. 4). In fact, Sacco and Beck follow this statement with a review 
of those studies "which provide support for the notion that negative percep- 
tions are causally related to the other symptoms of depression" (p. 21). Thus, 
it is still not clear that the current cognitive model is significantly different 
from the formulation described in our review. 
It would be useful to explore briefly what is at stake with the causal 
claims of the cognitive models. That depressed persons are pessimistic and 
complain about themselves was noted as early as the writing of  Robert Bur- 
ton in the 17th century and even the Book of Job. This observation was not 
left for the cognitive theorists to discover; rather, they suggested a new and 
special significance to these complaints. They argued that the study of depress- 
ed persons' self-complaints and negativity is not merely a descriptive exer- 
cise but an exploration of  the cause of  depression. 
There are obviously a number of  alternatives to the cognitive theorists' 
strong claims about causality. First, one might suggest, as Klein (1974) has 
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about some types of depression, that depressives' complaints reflect a secondary 
demoralization and self-blame for their condition, and that these complaints 
are best seen as an effect rather than a cause of depression. Second, one might 
argue that it is simply tautological that depressed persons complain about 
themselves and their situations: Not surprisingly, people who are chosen 
because they endorse self-complaints on the BDI, for instance, are likely to 
endorse self-complaints when they are given other possibilities to do so. There 
are other interpretations possible (we will outline one in particular later in 
this paper), but these two are important as those to which proponents of 
the cognitive models have had to react. Thus, the risk has always been that 
purported measures of cognitions associated with depression will be dismissed 
either as the effects of depression or as relatively uninteresting variations on 
some of the content of conventional measures of depression. Invoking causal 
arguments has been a defense of the usefulness of such measures. 
Segal and Shaw now reject the idea that thinking cause depression. The 
task then remains of establishing why the study of depressive cognitions re- 
mains interesting. Segal and Shaw indicate that one key reason is that it may 
be possible to identify a cognitive vulnerability to depression. This echoes 
a previous suggestion of  Kovacs and Beck (1978): "Certain cognitive pro- 
cesses seem chronically atypical among depressed patients and may repre- 
sent a stable characteristic of their personality" (p. 530). One may note in 
passing that the idea of a cognitive vulnerability is a causal one. Restated, 
the vulnerability hypothesis is that an identifiable, preexisting cognitive 
characteristic of some people will cause them to become depressed when they 
are confronted with a particular set of circumstances. However, the impor- 
tant point is that there is an empirically testable hypothesis here, even if there 
are more complications than Segal and Shaw acknowledge. 
VULNERABILITY MARKERS, PRODROMAL SIGNS, 
AND RESIDUALS 
We are puzzled by Segal and Shaw's depiction of negative results of 
Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larsen, and Franklin (1981) as "more an example 
of poor formulation than they are a refutation of  the cognitive model . . . .  
By regarding dysfunctional thinking in an undifferentiated way the assess- 
ment employed by Lewinsohn et al. (1981) failed to test the predictions derived 
from the cognitive model." Lewinsohn et al. obtained self-report and inter- 
view data from 998 community residents at two times, approximately 8 
months apart. Measures of a number of distinct constructs were obtained: 
causal attributions, expectancies of positive and negative outcomes (which 
constitute part of Beck's triad), irrational beliefs, perception of  control, and 
self-esteem. Diagnoses were obtained on the basis of structured interviews. 
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Contrary to the hypotheses that might have been generated by the 
cognitive theories, none of these measures was found to predict the onset 
of depression. Those persons who became depressed at Time 2 were not 
characterized premorbidly by pessimism, misattributions, and irrational 
negative beliefs. Lewinsohn et al. did not specifically test for the interaction 
between cognitive vulnerability and life stress. However, given their large 
N, one could expect that if such interaction were significant, it would be readi- 
ly detectable as a main effect for the cognitive measures-except in the unlike- 
ly case that there was a strong negative correlation between the cognitive 
measures and life stress. The absence of the main effect indicates the likely 
absence of an untested interaction effect. (This point is widely misunderstood 
in the literature concerning cognitive vulnerability for depression. See 
Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982, as an example 
of this misunderstanding.) 
This study has important implications for claims that there exists an 
identifiable cognitive vulnerability to depression. Segal and Shaw's attempt 
to escape its implications is by restricting the concept of vulnerability to per- 
sons who have been depressed in the past. This is a substantial revision of 
the concept, and it begs some important questions. For example, how does 
a person's first major depression come about, and what is the role of cogni- 
tion in that process? Are purported cognitive features of depression best seen 
as effects of the disorder that accumulate with the passage of time spent 
depressed? Is cognitive vulnerability acquired by being clinically depressed? 
Intriguing though these theoretical questions may be, their interest is 
diminished by the failure of efforts to identify cognitive differences endur- 
ing beyond a thorough recovery from a depressive episode. Segal and Shaw 
review studies that have used the DAS. They cite a number of recent studies, 
the published ones of which do not support their claims regarding the 
theoretical or practical utility of this measure. 
Four of the relevant published studies cited by Segal and Shaw 
(Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Reda, 1984; Silverman, Silverman, & Eardley, 
1984a; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984) found that DAS scores of depress- 
ed patients returned to normal levels after the depressive episode was judged 
to have remitted. Segal and Shaw, however, seem to have a preference for 
some unpublished studies over these. These studies suggest that although DAS 
scores may be lower at the end of the episode, they do not return to the nor- 
mal range. While they were not available to us, Segal and Shaw note that 
the two unpublished studies that support the existence of a cognitive 
vulnerability marker involved assessments only 2 to 3 weeks after judgment 
of remission. As Silverman et al. (1984b) note, the "maiadaptive attitudes 
gap" between treated depressives and normal controls may be a function of 
the incomplete recovery of the depressed patients. The note that Eves and 
Rush (1984), for example, used a Hamilton score of 10 or less a criterion 
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of recovery, and they suggest that different results may have been obtained 
had more stringent criteria been used. 
Some cognitive theorists, as we have noted, are nonplussed by these 
DAS findings. Riskind and Steer (1984), at Beck's Center for Cognitive 
Therapy, for example, discuss the Silverman et al. (1984a) findings that the 
DAS scores Of depressed patients were higher during the patients' depressive 
phase than during remission, and actually suggest that these findings are con- 
sistent with Beck's theory. They cite a quote from Beck arguing that "even 
though these negative attitudes..,  may not be prominent or even discerni- 
ble at a given time, they persist in a latent state . . . .  Once activated, these 
concepts dominate the person's thinking and lead to the typical depressive 
symptomatology." (Note the causal nature of this statement.) Riskind and 
Steer conclude that "therefore, the decrease in dysfunctional attitudes that 
Silverman et al. found is exactly what the cognitive theory would predict" 
(p. 1111). We find ourselves disappointed in their reasoning, and as we stated 
in our earlier article, "it is likely to be difficult to distinguish empirically a 
hypothesis concerning latent cognitive factors from the traditional assump- 
tion that when confronted with certain internal and external stimuli, some 
people become depressed, and negative thinking is simply one characteristic 
of this state" (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, p. 499). 
Other cognitive theorists have recognized that the findings with the DAS 
have been damaging to the cognitive models. Rush and Giles (1982), for ex- 
ample, cite an unpublished study in which they found that more severe 
depressive symptomatology was associated with greater endorsement of DAS 
items in both unipolar and bipolar patients, as compared to those patients 
who were less symptomatic or remitted. Rush and Giles interpreted the rela- 
tionships that they found between depression and this purported measure 
of schemas as being not as clear-cut as predicted by the cognitive theory. 
Nearly half of the symptomatic patients did not endorse any more dysfunc- 
tional attitudes than did normal college students without measured 
psychopathology. "Either the DAS is an inadequate instrument to measure 
schemas, or schemas play a key role in only a subgroup of depressed pa- 
tients. Further research into the role and relevance of schemas is needed . . . .  
The role of schemas posited by cognitive theory has received little confir- 
matory empirical support" (p. 174). 
It is possible to argue for the abandonment of the DAS rather than 
the hypotheses that its use has failed to support. Yet, given that the self- 
complaint of the type tapped by measures of purported depressive cognition 
also happen to be symptoms of depression, it will be difficult to establish 
that any such measure is a valid and reliable cognitive marker for depression 
and also not state-dependent. For example, certain features or symptoms 
of depression may be prodromal (Williams, 1985) rather than vulnerability 
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factors, and close observation of  depressed persons may demonstrate that 
these symptoms are early indications of a progressive state of  affairs that 
was set in motion by other factors. As an analogy, sniffles are better viewed 
as a prodromal symptom of a common cold than as a vulnerability factor. 
Alternatively, because criteria for demarcating the end of  an episode of 
depression are arbitrary, certain features such as elevated DAS scores may 
merely represent residual symptoms that would disappear over a longer period 
of time. Finally, even if such features were found to persist after other symp- 
toms of  the depression had subsided, it is still possible that they may reflect 
involvement in an intractible situation such as an unsupportive marriage that 
preceded both the onset of the depression and the appearance of  these par- 
ticular features. 
WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO COPING AND THE ENVIRONMENT? 
The fundamental defect in current cognitive approaches to depression 
is their utter lack of  attention to the difficulties faced by depressed persons 
in their everyday environments, how they cope, and with what consequences. 
It is likely that future theorists and researchers will think it exceedingly odd 
that anyone attempted to explore and explain the cognitive processes of  
depressed persons without reference to these factors. The predictable result 
is a misattribution of  distortion to the depressed persons' cognitive process 
of  what is more properly seen as a feature of their exchange with the en- 
vironment. Segal and Shaw offer little to correct this problem. In their survey, 
the depressed person's environment is seldom mentioned and has only a 
shadowy presence. Yet we remain hopeful that our earlier review will stimulate 
renewed interest in the possibility that the complaints of depressed persons 
have some basis in what is happening to them and, further, that the verbaliza- 
tions of  these complaints may be in part a miscarried effort to deal with these 
difficulties. 
Some recent research has demonstrated how upset people are with 
depressed persons with whom they live, and it has been suggested further, 
"In light o f . . .  [this], the emphasis of  cognitive model on the depressed per- 
son's distorted thinking processes may be unnecessary or at least overstated, 
and great attention to the social context of  depression may be warranted" 
(Coyne et al., in press, p. 17). Depressed persons deal with distressing cir- 
cumstances that often do not yield to their efforts, and they often do so in 
the face of overtly hostile, critical, and rejecting significant others. It would 
seem that negative verbalizations about the self in such a context does not 
require the postulation of  intractible cognitive processes. The modal depressed 
patient is probably a women with marital difficulties, and glib attempts to 
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reduce her problems to a matter of distorted cognitions have potentially per- 
nicious social implications. Yet that is what the current cognitive models of 
depressed seem to offer. 
SEGAL AND SHAW'S REAPPRAISAL REAPPRAISED 
The marks of a vigorous line of scientific inquiry include a clear link 
between methods and inference, serious considerations of alternative 
hypotheses, and the conduct of crucial experiments that have the potential 
for assisting a choice among these hypotheses (Platt, 1964). Segal and Shaw's 
implicit suggestions for the direction of future research do not meet such 
criteria, and they will be of little help in many attempts to resolve the press- 
ing empirical, conceptual, and methodological challenges facing the cognitive 
perspective. Basically, they are reassuring the reader that (a) depress- 
ed-nondepressed differences on various measures can be accepted as prima 
facie evidence of depressed persons' "negative distorted thinking," (b) that 
current efforts to assess vulnerability to depression using the DAS are prov- 
ing fruitful, and (c) that theorists and researchers can continue to ignore the 
environment. 
If space permitted, we could identify other specific points of disagree- 
ment with Segal and Shaw. In lieu of that, we simply will state that in our 
judgment the role of cognition in depression and how to study it needs to 
be rethought in some fundamental ways. If further contributions to 
knowledge are to result, the study of cognition in depression has to get beyond 
the DAS, the ASQ, and simplistic interpretations of what are basically cor- 
relations between measures of depression and instruments tapping more 
specific aspects of the disorder. If accepted, the loosened standards and 
misplaced optimism displayed by Segal and Shaw can only diminish the future 
prospects of the cognitive perspective. 
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